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ABSTRACT
Revisiting Lockhart: A Case for a Conditional Operator
by
Eric J. Tsai
Advisor: Sam Al Khatib
This thesis presents a case for a binary modal conditional operator compatible with both circum-
stantial and epistemic modal bases. Certain contexts involving might conditionals require might to
take wide-scope over a conditional proposition. A restrictor-view analysis of conditionals is unable
to derive both the intuitive meaning of the might conditional and the necessary conditional propo-
sition without positing a covert circumstantial necessity modal. However, based on observations of
the temporal orientation of conditionals, such a modal lacks independent motivation. On the other
hand, a binary modal conditional operator not only provides the necessary conditional proposition
but is also able to derive the intuitive meaning of the might conditional while accounting for the
observed modal environments of conditional antecedents and conditional consequents.
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1 Introduction
The dominant analysis of conditionals follows Lewis (1975) and Kratzer (1981, 2012) in viewing
conditionals as restricted quantification structures rather than as the output of a binary connective
operator. Under this restrictor view, the if -clause restricts a quantifier in the consequent of a
conditional. If there is no overt quantifier, the consequent is assumed to be implicitly modalized by
a covert epistemic necessity modal similar in semantics to epistemic must. The proposal of a covert
modal raises the possibility that some explicitly modalized conditionals are multi-modal. In fact,
it is well documented (Zvolenszky, 2002; Geurts, 2004; Condoravdi & Lauer, 2016) that certain
readings of modalized conditionals require such structures. On the other hand, it has also been
shown (von Fintel & Heim, 2011; Khoo, 2011; Kratzer, 2012) that certain readings of modalized
conditionals are incompatible with such structures. These last cases have proven intractable for an
operator view of if since, under such an analysis, all modalized conditionals are multi-modal.
The goal of this thesis is to provide a case for a strict implication account (i.e., operator view)
of if as a binary modal operator which might prove resilient to arguments that certain readings
of modalized conditionals are incompatible with the operator view. In section 2, we revisit the
arguments provided by von Fintel & Heim (2011) against such an account. These arguments
are based on readings of conditionals with an overt might in the consequent. In section 3, we
introduce a particular context (ifttc sequence) in which such might conditionals require a wide-
scope structure incompatible with the restrictor view of if -clauses but compatible with the operator
view. We also consider possible counterarguments which a defender of the restrictor view might
raise against the necessity of such a structure. In section 4, we show that an attempt to expand
the restrictor view to capture the intuitive readings of might conditionals as well as the readings
of ifttc sequences is incompatible with observations of the modal environments of conditionals.
On the other hand, the operator view is not only compatible with these observations but also
accounts for the modal environments of conditional antecedents which the restrictor view does not
do. In section 5, we explore potential issues involving overgeneration caused by various scope
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configurations under the operator view and suggest directions for future research. In section 6,
we explore a possible connection between the availability of wide-scope readings and tense. In
section 7, we provide a summary of the thesis.
2 Lockhart
In arguing for the restrictor view of if -clauses, von Fintel & Heim (2011) claim that operator
views of conditionals, namely material and strict implication, are unable to capture the intuitive
meaning of certain modalized conditionals. We will forgo comment on their arguments against the
material implication view and focus instead on their arguments against a strict implication analysis
of conditionals in which if functions as a binary modal operator. Consider the scenario below.
Scenario: Mary and Susan are in a car. They are lost and have just driven into a town





















figure 1: Road map of Lockhart and environs
(1) If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
The intended reading of (1) as uttered by Mary in the above scenario is epistemic. The modal
base that von Fintel & Heim have in mind for the modal might returns worlds compatible with "the
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information provided by the map, together with other background knowledge" (p. 52). A strict
implication analysis of the conditional in (1) introduces an additional modal operator, if, which von
Fintel & Heim also take to have an epistemic flavor. This binary modal operator is parameterized
with an accessibility relation and takes two propositions as arguments, both of which may also be
modalized. The two possible scope configurations between if and might in (1) are indicated by the
LFs in (2a) and (2b) where R1 and R2 represent the contextually supplied accessibility relations
taken here as arguments. According to von Fintel & Heim, neither configuration is able to derive
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Their argument against the LF in (2a) goes something like this. Due to Mary’s epistemic state
of being lost, a world, w1, in which she and Susan are on Route 183 and a world, w2, in which
they are on Route 80 are both epistemically accessible via the relation R1 from the actual world,
w∗. However, the antecedent of (2a) restricts this domain to worlds in which Susan and Mary are
truthfully on Route 183, filtering out worlds like w2 and leaving only worlds like w1. Each of these
3
remaining worlds must, via the relation R2, have some epistemically accessible world in which
Susan and Mary are in Lockhart. But because Mary is presumably as lost in w1 (a Route-183
world) as she is in w2 (a Route-80 world), any epistemic possibility of being in Lockhart in w1
should be epistemically possible in w2 as well. Therefore, given the LF in (2a), if (1) is true in the
actual world then (3) is predicted to also be true, contrary to our intuitions.
(3) # If we are on Route 80, we might be in Lockhart now.
While this argument is convincing, their dismissal of the wide-scope reading of might in (2b)
is less so.
. . . with the modal having widest scope . . . we would derive the claim that it is compat-
ible with what Mary knows that from being on 183 it follows (according to what she
knows) that they are in Lockhart. Clearly, that is not what [(1)] means. Mary doesn’t
consider it possible that if they are on 183, she knows that they are in Lockhart. After
all, she’s well aware that she doesn’t know where they are.
(von Fintel & Heim, 2011:55)
Crucial to their argument is the epistemic flavor of the conditional modal if under the scope of might.
While arguments have been made in support of the restrictor view for bare indicative conditionals
being implicitly modalized by an epistemic necessity modal, a strict implication operator view need
not make that same assumption. Assuming that the modal flavor of the embedded bare conditional
is circumstantial, the derived claim resulting from (2b) can be restated as:
It is compatible with what Mary knows that from being on 183 it follows (according to
the facts) that they are in Lockhart.
This seems to match the meaning of (1) where, based on the information provided by the map,
Mary does indeed consider it possible that if they are on 183, they are necessarily in Lockhart. In
addition, a wide-scope interpretation of might also derives the intuition regarding the falseness of
4
(3) since Mary also knows, based on the map, that Lockhart is nowhere near Route 80. By only
considering an epistemic accessibility relation for a conditional modal operator analysis of if, von
Fintel & Heim overlook possible wide-scope derivations of (1) and (3) which, in fact, do adhere to
our intuitions.
3 If that’s the case . . .
Setting aside for now the plausibility of a circumstantial modal base for the embedded bare condi-
tional, there are certain contexts where a simple restrictor-view analysis of conditionals is unable to
derive the intuitive reading of a might conditional like (1). Instead, these might conditionals seem
to require a structure such as (2b). The particular context and dialogue sequence we are interested in
involves an initiating might conditional followed by another conditional whose antecedent contains
the phrase that’s the case as schematized in (4):
(4) ifttc sequence
a. If p, then might q.
b. Well, if that’s the case, then r .
What restrictions exist, if any, on the antecedent of that in that’s the case? Consider the
following "simplified" ifttc sequences where the initiating utterance is a bare might rather than a
conditionalized might.
(5) a. Jules might be at the party.
b. Well, if that’s the case, then Jim might be there.
(6) a. Jules might be at the party.
b. Well, if that’s the case, then Jim will be there.
Given a scenario where Jules and Jim are inseparable, both continuations seem felicitous. In
(5b) the referent of that appears to be the entire modalized utterance in (5a). In (6b) the referent
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appears to be the modal prejacent in (6a). Both syntactic constituents and their subconstituents
seem to be valid referents. However, non-constituents seem to be unavailable.
(7) a. Either Kathe or Jules will be at the party.
b. Well, if that’s the case, then Jim might be there.
(8) a. Either Kathe or Jules will be at the party.
b. # Well, if that’s the case, then Jim will be there.
Given the same scenario as above, the disjunction does not allow one of the disjuncts to be
considered individually. The demonstrative that in the continuation in (8b) cannot refer to the
proposition, Jules will be at the party. We therefore take the antecedent of that in the phrase that’s
the case to necessarily be a syntactic constituent.
Returning to the scenario in (1), consider the possibility that Mary is not entirely lost but knows
that they are in a town on Route 142. This knowledge, coupled with the information provided by
the map in figure 1, reproduced below, would allow her to truthfully utter either of the conditionals





















figure 1: Road map of Lockhart and environs
(9) a. If we are on Route 183, we are in Lockhart now.
b. If we are on Route 80, we are in Martindale now.
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Likewise, if she knows that they are in a town along Route 87, she could truthfully utter either of
the conditionals in (10) or the pair without contradiction.
(10) a. If we are on Route 183, we are in Cuero now.
b. If we are on Route 80, we are in Nixon now.
But what she cannot ever truthfully utter are the pair (9a) and (10b) and the pair (9b) and (10a) since
both of those pairs are incompatible with the information provided by the map. Now, assuming
again that Mary is indeed lost, consider two possible continuations of the ifttc sequence in (11)
which has (1) as the initiating utterance.
(11) Mary: If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
a. # Susan: Well, if that’s the case, then, if we are on Route 80 we’re in Nixon.
b. Susan: Well, if that’s the case, then, if we are on Route 80 we’re in Martindale.
While the continuation (11a) sounds odd, the continuation (11b) seems okay. However, the
restrictor view fails to predict this asymmetry. Under the restrictor view, conditionals are modal
statements with an explicit domain restrictor provided by the antecedent. In the case of bare
conditionals as in (11a) and (11b), the restricted modal is taken to be a covert epistemic necessity
modal (◻). Furthermore, stacked if -clauses provide multiple restrictions to a single modal (Kratzer,
2012). Therefore the bare conditionals (11a) and (11b), with their stacked if -clauses, reduce to the
modal statements below where the restriction φttc provided by the phrase that’s the case refers to
a proposition represented by a syntactic constituent.
(11) a. ◻[80,φttc]Nixon
b. ◻[80,φttc]Martindale


















The LF in (12) provides the three circled candidates for the restriction φttc in (11a) and (11b).




Substituting the explicitly restricted modal (13a) for both continuations, as in (14a) and (14b),
fails to predict any asymmetry.
(14) a. # ◻[80,◇[183]Lock]Nixon
b. # ◻[80,◇[183]Lock]Martindale
The substituted might conditional is true regardless of whether Mary and Susan are on Route 142,
Route 87, or even Route 90. In fact, due to Mary’s epistemic state of being lost, Mary’s utterance
is true regardless of where they are. A world in which they are on Route 90 and Route 80 is
epistemically accessible from the actual world and meets both restrictions, but it is a world in which
Mary and Susan are neither in Nixon nor in Martindale. Therefore the universal claims in (14a) and
(14b) are predicted to both be false. Substituting the modal prejacent (13c) for both continuations,
as in (15a) and (15b), also fails to predict any asymmetry since both conditionals turn out to be




Substituting the antecedent (13b) of the preceding conditional for both continuations, as in
(16a) and (16b), fails to entail being in either Nixon or in Martindale.
(16) a. # ◻[80,183]Nixon
b. # ◻[80,183]Martindale
In fact, the restriction of being both on Route 80 and Route 183 entails that Mary and Susan are
instead in Luling. Available antecedents under the restrictor view are therefore unable to derive the
asymmetry presented in (11).
A strict implication operator view of (11), however, provides additional reference possibilities
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The LF in (2a) additionally provides the bare modal, as in (17a), and the LF in (2b) additionally
provides, as the prejacent of might, the bare conditional, as in (17b).
(17) Additional candidates for φttc provided by (2a) and (2b)
a. ◇Lock
b. ◻[183]Lock
Similar to the case in (14a) and (14b) with the entire modalized conditional, substituting the
bare modal in (17a) for φttc, as in (18a) and (18b), derives no asymmetry.
(18) a. # ◻[80,◇Lock]Nixon
b. # ◻[80,◇Lock]Martindale
The bare modal, just like the explicitly restricted modal, is too weak to entail that from being on
Route 80 it follows that Mary and Susan are in a specific location. However, substituting the bare
conditional in (17b) for φttc, as in (19a) and (19b), does derive the asymmetry.
(19) a. # ◻[80,◻[183]Lock]Nixon
b. ◻[80,◻[183]Lock]Martindale
The truth of the substituted bare conditional in (17b) requires that the accessible worlds quanti-
fied over by the modal are worlds in which Mary and Susan are somewhere on Route 142. However,
being on Route 142 and on Route 80 is incompatible with being in Nixon, thus deriving the false-
ness of (19a). In fact, being on Route 142 and on Route 80 entails being in Martindale, thus
deriving the truth of (19b). Therefore, deriving the asymmetry between (11a) and (11b) seems to
require an interpretation where the anaphor in the continuation is anaphoric to a preceding (bare)
conditional proposition. A restrictor view of the initiating might conditional in (11) fails to provide
the necessary referent.
A defender of the restrictor view might argue against the necessity of conditional propositions
in (11) by appealing to the same mechanism of "restriction at a distance" employed by Kratzer
(2012) in her argument against the necessity of conditional propositions in examples such as (20).
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(20) If a wolf entered the house, he might have eaten the little girl with the red cap. In fact,
that’s rather likely.
The demonstrative that which is the prejacent of the modal operator rather likely in the second
sentence of (20) seems to refer to the bare conditional proposition if a wolf entered the house, he
ate the little girl with the red cap. However, Kratzer argues that the same interpretation can be
derived if the demonstrative that simply refers to the consequent of the preceding conditional (i.e.,
the prejacent of the modal might) and the modal operator rather likely is restricted at a distance by
the antecedent of the preceding conditional. These two anaphoric links result in the reconstructed
equivalent of (20) in (21).
(21) If a wolf entered the house, he might have eaten the little girl with the red cap. In fact,
if a wolf entered the house, he rather likely ate the little girl with the red cap.
Recruiting this argument for a restrictor-view analysis of the asymmetry in (11), repeated below,
requires not only the two anaphoric links argued for in (20) but an additional anaphoric link to an
epistemic necessity modal since the demonstrative that in the continuations (11a) and (11b) is not
overtly modalized as it is in (20).
(11) Mary: If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
a. # Susan: Well, if that’s the case, then, if we are on Route 80 we’re in Nixon.
b. Susan: Well, if that’s the case, then, if we are on Route 80 we’re in Martindale.
However, the sequence contains no referable necessity modal since the initiating might conditional,
in concordance with the restrictor view, is assumed to not contain a covert necessity modal. There-
fore, the epistemic necessity modal necessary to reconstruct the bare conditional via "restriction
at a distance" must be inserted outright, requiring no anaphoric link and no overt restriction, or
must have already existed covertly. If that is the case, then any proposition as well as any proposi-
tional anaphor could presumably be covertly modalized and implicitly conditionalized at a distance.
However, von Fintel & Gillies (2010) offer the following contrast.
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(22) a. Richard I: If he didn’t tell Harry, he told Tom.
b. Richard II: I’m not sure that’s true.
c. Richard I: No, really. I know he told one of them.
(23) a. Richard I: If he didn’t tell Harry, he told Tom.
b. Richard II: I’m not sure (it’s true that) he told Tom.
c. # Richard I: No, really. I know he told one of them.
In (22b), the demonstrative that refers to the entire conditional utterance of (22a), i.e., Richard
II is not sure if the conditional uttered by Richard I is true. However, if propositions can be covertly
modalized and then restricted at a distance, then the bare conditional in (23a) can be reconstructed
from the proposition he told Tom in (23b). Richard I’s response should therefore be just as felicitous
in (23) as it is in (22). The fact that the bare conditionals themselves in (22) and (23) have covert
modals as opposed to an overt modal as in the might conditional in (11) is inconsequential to this
point. Regardless of whether (23b) is analyzed as containing a covert anaphor that is anaphoric
to the covert modal in (23a) or as containing a covert modal outright, as is necessary for the
continuations in (11), the continuation of (23c) is still infelicitous. Appealing to an inserted covert
modal in the continuations in (11) in order to employ Kratzer’s "restriction at a distance" strategy
requires an explanation for why such a modal is not available in (23b).
Furthermore, von Fintel & Gillies (2010) offer an additional contrast which seems to complicate
the basis for Kratzer’s remote restriction assumption in (20) which stems from examples such as
(24).
(24) If a wolf entered the house, he must have eaten grandma, since she was bedridden. He
might have eaten the girl with the red cap, too. In fact, that’s rather likely. The poor little
thing wouldn’t have been able to defend herself.
The if -clause in (24) seems not only to restrict the modal (must) in its own clause but also to remotely
restrict each of the modals (might, rather likely, would) in the subsequent clauses. However, in the
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contrasting exchanges offered by von Fintel and Gillies below, the if -clause in (26a) does not seem
to be able to restrict the modal in (26b).
(25) a. Richard I: If he didn’t tell Harry, he told Tom.
b. Richard II: That may be true.
c. Richard I: No, really. I know he told one of them.
(26) a. Richard I: If he didn’t tell Harry, he told Tom.
b. Richard II: Maybe (it’s true that) he told Tom.
c. # Richard I: No, really. I know he told one of them.
Appealing to the remote restriction of modals by the if -clauses in (20) and (24) requires an
explanation for why such a restriction is not possible in (26). A restrictor-view analysis of (11)
therefore relies on two mechanisms, (1) implicitly restricted covert modalization and (2) restriction
at a distance, whose constraints need to be explored further.
At this point, the astute reader might point out the problem posed by (24) for the operator
view. While both the if -clause restriction and the modal prejacent inherited by rather likely in (20)
originate from the same conditional, the inherited referents for rather likely in (24) originate from
different sentences. Therefore, the desired conditional proposition in (24), unlike in (20), cannot
possibly be a syntactic constituent. With regards to the intractability of (24) for the operator view,
the broader mechanism of implicit conditionalization of modals via modal subordination may be
applicable. As Geurts (1999) notes, "modal subordination occurs whenever a modal expression
sets up an antecedent for another modal expression" (p. 187). Explicit if -clauses are not the only
restrictors of subordinated modals.
(27) A thief might break into the house. He would take the silver.
In (27), the prejacent of the modal might, rather than an if -clause, conditionalizes the subsequent
modal by serving as an implicit antecedent. The second sentence is therefore interpreted as the
conditional if a thief breaks into the house, he would take the silver. Insofar as an if -clause is
13
part of a modal expression, modal subordination, under Guerts’s characterization, should be able
to accommodate implicit conditionalization by either the antecedent proposition or the consequent
proposition of a conditional. Furthermore, whatever mechanism underlies modal subordination
does not necessarily involve restriction of subordinate modals; only "(setting) up an antecedent for
another modal expression". Such a mechanism should be compatible with any theory of conditionals
insofar as modal expressions with antecedents are analyzed as conditionals. An explanation for how
the operator rather likely in (24) is ultimately conditionalized (i.e., how the interpreted conditional
is constructed) is therefore not necessarily one that the operator view, or any view of conditionals,
needs to provide.
What we hoped to show in this section is that the restrictor view is incapable of deriving
the asymmetry in (11), repeated below, without appealing to (i) the availability of covertly and/or
anaphorically restricted covert necessity modals and (ii) the ability for if -clauses to restrict operators
at a distance.
(11) Mary: If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
a. # Susan: Well, if that’s the case, then, if we are on Route 80 we’re in Nixon.
b. Susan: Well, if that’s the case, then, if we are on Route 80 we’re in Martindale.
We then provided examples refuting both (i) and (ii). We also raised the possibility that the apparent
mechanism of remote restriction by if -clauses falls within the framework of a more general concept
of modal subordination.
4 Temporal Orientation of Conditionals
In section 3, we showed that in certain scenarios, might conditionals in ifttc sequences require
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While the restrictor view can accommodate such a structure by recruiting the covert epistemic
necessity modal posited for bare conditionals, von Fintel & Heim (2011) argue that such a doubly-
modalized structure fails to capture the intuitive meaning of might conditionals, such as (1), repeated
below.1
(1) If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
However, as mentioned in section 2, a circumstantial reading of the embedded conditional propo-
sition does seem to capture the intuitive meaning. But in order to derive such a reading, the
restrictor view would either need to posit an additional covert circumstantial modal for cases such
as (1) or posit a covert necessity operator that is compatible with both epistemic and circumstantial
modal bases. In the remainder of this section we show that consequents of bare conditionals are
infelicitous with readings compatible with circumstantial modal bases and thus both of the above
1The corresponding restrictor-view structure of (2b) is given below in (2b′) where nec represents























options for updating the implicit modalization of bare conditionals under the restrictor view are
unsatisfactory.
As Copley (2008) observes, conditional antecedents and consequents are subject to different
and independent modal environments. The environment of conditional antecedents distributes
similarly to that of modal operators which, as Klecha (2016) argues, are compatible with not
only doxastic/epistemic modal bases but also circumstantial modal bases. On the other hand, the
environment of bare conditional consequents distributes similarly to environments which are either
non-modal or are solely epistemic. Consider the case of the simple present in English.
As seen in (28), the non-modalized simple present in English is felicitous with a stative or
derived stative predicate with present orientation (PO) as in (28a, c, e, g). Eventive predicates,
however, are never felicitous with present orientation. A predicate with future orientation (FO) is
felicitous only with a futurate, i.e., settled, or habitual (F/H) reading of the future eventuality as in
(28b, f, j). Although we will give no formal description of the notion of settledness, an eventuality
can be settled if it is planned or scheduled or if it is somehow pre-determined by past, present, and
indefeasible laws. If a F/H reading is unavailable due to the nature of the predicate as in (28d, h, j),
the simple present is infelicitous.
(28) non-modal
stative
a. John is at the office currently. (PO)
b. John is at the office tomorrow. (F/H only)
c. John is sick currently. (PO)
d. # John is sick tomorrow. (FO)
derived stative
e. John is seeing the dean currently. (PO)
f. John is seeing the dean tomorrow. (F/H only)
g. It is raining currently. (PO)
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h. # It is raining tomorrow. (FO)
eventive
i. # John sees the dean currently. (PO)
j. John sees the dean tomorrow. (F/H only)
k. # It rains currently. (PO)
l. # It rains tomorrow. (FO)
Modal environments distribute somewhat differently depending on the interpretation of the modal
operator. Deontic interpretations allow for future orientation of the modal prejacent while epistemic
interpretations only allow for F/H readings of future-oriented prejacents.
(29) modal
stative
a. John has to be at the office currently. (deontic/epistemic PO)
b. John has to be at the office tomorrow. (deontic FO or deontic/epistemic F/H)
c. John has to be sick currently. (deontic/epistemic PO)
d. John has to be sick tomorrow. (deontic FO)
derived stative
e. John has to be seeing the dean currently. (deontic/epistemic PO)
f. John has to be seeing the dean tomorrow. (deontic FO or deontic/epistemic F/H)
g. It has to be raining currently. (deontic/epistemic PO)
h. It has to be raining tomorrow. (deontic FO)
eventive
i. # John has to see the dean currently. (PO)
j. John has to see the dean tomorrow. (deontic FO or deontic/epistemic F/H)
k. # It has to rain currently. (PO)
l. It has to rain tomorrow. (deontic FO)
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As noted by Klecha (2016), the available readings of embedded simple present vary depending
on the embedding verb. The available readings of simple present under attitude verbs like think
distribute similarly to the available readings under epistemic interpretations of modals. Readings




a. John thinks Mary is at the office currently. (PO)
b. John thinks Mary is at the office tomorrow. (F/H only)
c. John thinks Mary is sick currently. (PO)
d. # John thinks Mary is sick tomorrow. (FO)
derived stative
e. John thinks he is seeing the dean currently. (PO)
f. John thinks he is seeing the dean tomorrow. (F/H only)
g. John thinks it is raining currently. (PO)
h. # John thinks it is raining tomorrow. (FO)
eventive
i. # John thinks he sees the dean currently. (PO)
j. John thinks he sees the dean tomorrow. (F/H only)
k. # John thinks it rains currently. (PO)
l. # John thinks it rains tomorrow. (FO)
(31) hope-type verbs
stative
a. John hopes Mary is at the office currently. (PO)
b. John hopes Mary is at the office tomorrow. (FO or F/H)
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c. John hopes he is sick currently. (PO)
d. John hopes he is sick tomorrow. (FO)
derived stative
e. John hopes he is seeing the dean currently. (PO)
f. John hopes he is seeing the dean tomorrow. (FO or F/H)
g. John hopes it is raining currently. (PO)
h. John hopes it is raining tomorrow. (FO)
eventive
i. # John hopes he sees the dean currently. (PO)
j. John hopes he sees the dean tomorrow. (FO or F/H)
k. # John hopes it rains currently. (PO)
l. John hopes it rains tomorrow. (FO)
Furthermore, as noted by Copley (2008), the antecedent and the consequent of a conditional do
not necessarily share the same modal interpretation. In the case of the simple present, conditional
antecedents distribute similarly to hope-type verbs. It is therefore not implausible that, given their
access to the full range of possible temporal orientations, conditional antecedents and hope-type
verbs are compatible with both doxastic/epistemic and circumstantial modal bases.
(32) antecedents
stative
a. If John is at the office currently. . . (PO)
b. If John is at the office tomorrow. . . (FO or F/H)
c. If John is sick currently. . . (PO)
d. If John is sick tomorrow. . . (FO)
derived stative
e. If John is seeing the dean currently. . . (PO)
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f. If John is seeing the dean tomorrow. . . (FO or F/H)
g. If it is raining currently. . . (PO)
h. If it is raining tomorrow. . . (FO)
eventive
i. # If John sees the dean currently. . . (PO)
j. If John sees the dean tomorrow. . . (FO or F/H)
k. # If it rains currently. . . (PO)
l. If it rains tomorrow. . . (FO)
Bare conditional consequents, however, distribute with think-type verbs and non-modal environ-
ments, while modalized consequents seem to distribute according to the constraints imposed on the
particular modal operator.
(33) bare consequents
If Mary is sick currently, then. . .
stative
a. John is at the office currently. (PO)
b. John is at the office tomorrow. (F/H only)
c. John is sick currently. (PO)
d. # John is sick tomorrow. (FO)
derived stative
e. John is seeing the dean currently. (PO)
f. John is seeing the dean tomorrow. (F/H only)
g. It is raining currently. (PO)
h. # It is raining tomorrow. (FO)
eventive
i. # John sees the dean currently. (PO)
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j. John sees the dean tomorrow. (F/H only)
k. # It rains currently. (PO)
l. # It rains tomorrow. (FO)
(34) modalized consequents
If Mary is sick currently, then. . .
stative
a. John has to be at the office currently. (deontic/epistemic PO)
b. John has to be at the office tomorrow. (deontic FO or epistemic F/H)
c. John has to be sick currently. (deontic/epistemic PO)
d. John has to be sick tomorrow. (deontic FO)
derived stative
e. John has to be seeing the dean currently. (deontic/epistemic PO)
f. John has to be seeing the dean tomorrow. (deontic FO or epistemic F/H)
g. It has to be raining currently. (deontic/epistemic PO)
h. It has to be raining tomorrow. (deontic FO)
eventive
i. # John has to see the dean currently. (PO)
j. John has to see the dean tomorrow. (deontic FO or epistemic F/H)
k. # It has to rain currently. (PO)
l. It has to rain tomorrow. (deontic FO)
Bare conditional consequents, if taken to be implicitly modalized as claimed under the restrictor
view, seem to be incompatible with readings associated with a circumstantial modal base. Thus,
there seems to be no independent evidence for a covert circumstantial necessity modal required by
the restrictor view to derive both the intuitive reading of (1) and the asymmetry in (11).
(1) If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
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(11) Mary: If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
a. # Susan: Well, if that’s the case, then, if we are on Route 80 we’re in Nixon.
b. Susan: Well, if that’s the case, then, if we are on Route 80 we’re in Martindale.
On the other hand, an analysis of if as a binary modal operator that patterns similarly to hope-type
attitude verbs provides the compatibility with a circumstantial modal base that is required for the
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The binary modal operator analysis also provides the independence between conditional an-
tecedents and consequents observed by Copley (2008). Under such an analysis, the modal operator
if governs the modal environment of the antecedent (its first argument) while the modal environ-
ment, if any, of the consequent (its second argument) is equivalent to its reading at the matrix
level.2 In (35) below, the circumstantial modal base of if in the antecedent does not extend to the
consequent, i.e., a future-oriented eventive is licensed in the antecedent but not in the consequent.
(35) a. # If it drops below freezing, then it snows tomorrow.
Similarly, a future-oriented eventive licensed by an epistemic might in the consequent of a narrow-
scope reading of a might conditional is no longer licensed once the modal takes wide-scope over
2This is not to say that bare conditional consequents cannot be covertly modalized. Indeed,
consequents can have generic or futurate and habitual readings. So, whatever covert operation
is assumed to function on such sentences at the matrix level would function similarly on such
sentences in conditional consequents.
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a bare conditional. A might conditional with a future-orientated eventive consequent is therefore
predicted to be incompatible with the structure in (2b) since the bare consequent of the embedded
conditional is incompatible with future-orientated eventives. Consider the ifttc sequence below.
(36) a. If it drops below freezing, then it might snow tomorrow.
b. # Well, if that’s the case, then, if it’s above freezing, it will rain.
The inference required for the nested conditional in the continuation in (36b) to be true, namely
that there will be precipitation tomorrow, is not inferable from the preceding might conditional since
the embedded bare conditional which would provide that inference is itself infelicitous. However,
a nested conditional with the inference made explicit is felicitous.
(37) a. If there’s precipitation tomorrow, then, if it’s above freezing, it will rain.
What we hoped to show in this section is that a covert circumstantial necessity modal required by
the restrictor view to derive the intuitive reading of (1) and the asymmetry in (11) lacks independent
motivation since a circumstantial modal base is incompatible with the observed modal environments
of bare conditional consequents. In addition, the restrictor view makes no prediction whatsoever
about the modal environments of conditional antecedents whereas a binary modal operator analysis
of if not only accounts for the observed temporal orientation of conditionals but does so with a
structure which captures the intuitive reading of (1) and the asymmetry in (11).
5 Operator View
We have argued that in certain scenarios, discourses involving might conditionals require a wide-
scope reading of might over a bare conditional with a circumstantial interpretation. We have also
argued that the restrictor view is unable to capture these readings since, according to that view,
the consequent of a bare conditional is implicitly modalized, and we have provided evidence that
consequents of bare conditionals distribute with either non-modal or epistemic modal interpretations
but not with circumstantial modal interpretations. On the other hand, we also provided evidence that
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conditional antecedents distribute with the readings of modal prejacents under both epistemic and
circumstantial interpretations. We therefore propose that if is a binary modal operator which, like
must, is compatible with both epistemic and circumstantial interpretations. The intuitive meaning
of (1) and the asymmetry of the ifttc sequence in (11) can be captured by a wide-scope reading of
might over a conditional headed by if with a circumstantial interpretation. However, in proposing
multiple interpretations for if, we run the risk of overgeneration. Consider the following possible
scope configurations between might and either of the two if interpretations, if epi and if cir.
(38) Possible operator-view LF scope configurations for might conditionals
a. might ≻ if epi
b. might ≻ if cir
c. if epi ≻ might
d. if cir ≻ might
As mentioned in section 2, the argument von Fintel & Heim (2011) provide against the scope
configuration in (38a) for the might conditional in (1), repeated below, relies on a derived reading
which is incompatible with the fact that Mary is lost in that given scenario.
(1) If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
Their argument against the scope configuration in (38c) relies on derived readings, such as the truth
of (3), repeated below, which are incompatible with what Mary knows based on the information
encoded in her map (figure 1).
(3) If we are on Route 80, we might be in Lockhart now.
Although they do not consider the configuration in (38d), their argument against (38c) also
applies to (38d). The configuration in (38b), however, as already discussed, not only derives
a claim which seems to capture the intuitive meaning of (1) but also seems to be an available
structure given the felicitous continuation in (11b). We summarize these claims in the second






















figure 1: Road map of Lockhart and environs
indicated scenario and a check mark (✓) indicates a compatible and available reading. With
regards to overgeneration, the cases which are problematic for the operator view are cases where a
particular scope configuration derives a reading which is compatible with but yet unavailable in a
given scenario. Such cases require some explanation for why such readings are not available.
lost ∧ map lost ∧ ¬map 142 ∧ map 142 ∧ ¬map
(38a) might ≻ if epi n/a n/a too weak ?
(38b) might ≻ if cir ✓ ✓ too weak ✓
(38c) if epi ≻ might n/a ✓ n/a ✓
(38d) if cir ≻ might n/a ✓ n/a ✓
table 2: Lockhart scope configuration availability
Crucial to the scenario in (1) is the assumption that Mary believes the information encoded
in the map. Without this assumption, the scenario becomes compatible with the configurations
in (38c) and (38d) which derive the truth of both (1) and (3). These narrow-scope configurations
of might effectively render the conditional antecedent vacuous and appropriately reflect Mary’s
distrust of the map in this updated scenario. The derived claims from the configuration in (38a)
remain incompatible since Mary’s epistemic state is still one of being lost. The derived claims
from the configuration in (38b) remain compatible and intuitive as long as Mary is open to any map
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possibility. We summarize these claims regarding this updated scenario in the third column (lost
∧ ¬map) of table 2.
At this point we do not yet have a scenario which is compatible with the reading derived from
the configuration in (38a). For such a reading to be true there must be a world, w, epistemically
accessible from the actual world, w∗, in which every Route-183 world epistemically accessible from
w is also a Lockhart world. Consider a scenario in which Mary knows that they are somewhere
on Route 142 and she also knows the map she is looking at is accurate. In this scenario, any
epistemically accessible world, w, is not only a Route-142 world but also a world in which Mary
knows they are on Route 142 and also knows the map she is looking at is accurate. Therefore, not
just w but every world accessible from the actual world is a world whose epistemically accessible
Route-183 worlds guarantee that Susan and Mary are in Lockhart. The claim derived from (38a)
in this scenario is therefore too weak, as is the claim derived from (38b). These derived readings
are pragmatically infelicitous. As in the original scenario, the claims derived from (38c) and (38d),
such as the truth of (3), are incompatible with Mary’s belief in the information encoded in the map.
We summarize these claims regarding this updated scenario in the fourth column (142 ∧ map) of
table 2.
Now, consider a scenario in which Mary knows that they are somewhere on Route 142 but she
is unsure whether the map she is looking at is accurate. In this scenario, a world, w1, where they are
on Route 142 and the map is accurate and she knows it, and a world, w2, where they are on Route
142 and the same map is not accurate and she knows it are both compatible with her belief state in
that actual world, w∗. Furthermore, the Route-183 worlds compatible with her belief state in w1 are
necessarily Lockhart worlds. However, Route-183 worlds compatible with her belief state in w2 are
not necessarily Lockhart-worlds since, in these worlds, she cannot rely on the map and therefore
cannot conclude that being on Route 142 and being on Route 183 entails being in Lockhart. We
therefore have a scenario with which the reading derived from the scope configuration in (38a)
is not only compatible but in which it is pragmatically felicitous, unlike in the previous scenario
in which the reading is too weak. The derived claims from the configuration in (38b) are also
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compatible and intuitive as long as Mary is open to any map possibility. The vacuous antecedents
rendered by the narrow-scope configurations in (38c) and (38d) are also compatible due to Mary’s
distrust of the map. We summarize these claims regarding this updated scenario in the fifth column
(142 ∧ ¬map) of table 2 but with one reservation. Is the reading provided by the configuration
in (38a), although compatible with the above scenario, actually available? Consider the following
exchange.
Scenario (142 ∧ ¬map): Mary and Susan are driving in a car. They have just passed a
Route 142 sign. Mary pulls out an old crusty atlas dated 1845 from under the seat and





















figure 3: Road map of Lockhart and environs dated 1845
(39) a. Mary: If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
b. # Susan: Well, if that’s the case, then you must think that map is accurate.
If the might conditional in (39a) is interpreted with the wide-scope configuration in (38a) then
the embedded bare conditional if we are on Route 183, we are in Lockhart now would have an
epistemic accessibility relation based on Mary’s belief that the map is accurate. Based on the truth
of that embedded bare conditional, Susan would be justified to think that Mary believes the map is
accurate and thus (39b) is predicted to be felicitous provided that the embedded bare conditional
27
in (39a) is an available referent for that in the phrase that’s the case in (39b). However, the ifttc
sequence in (39) suggests that a reading of (39a) based on the configuration in (38a), although
compatible with the scenario, is not available, thereby compelling a defender of the operator view
to provide an independent constraint or some other explanation for why the reading derived from
the configuration in (38a) is unavailable. An issue to maybe consider is what happens to the
accessibility relations of modal statements in anaphoric relationships.
Finally, consider Mary’s response in (40c) to the felicitous ifttc sequence in (11) repeated here
as (40a-b).
(40) a. Mary: If we are on Route 183, then we might be in Lockhart now.
b. Susan: Well, if that’s the case, then, if we are on Route 80 we are in Martindale.
c. Mary: That’s not what I meant. I just meant that Lockhart is on Route 183.
Mary’s clarification seems to suggest an intended reading derived from a restrictor-view analysis
of the might conditional, rather than one which provides the conditional proposition (if we are on
Route 183, we are in Lockhart now) necessary for Susan’s utterance to be true. Nevertheless,
Susan’s utterance, based on her misunderstanding of (40a), is still true in this scenario and requires
a wide-scope reading of (40a) for it to be so. Neither the restrictor view nor the operator view is
able to derive both Mary’s intended reading and Susan’s misunderstanding of (40a). However, by
adopting a shifty conditional operator along the lines of Gillies (2010), the readings derived from
the scope configurations in (38c) and (38d) which were previously incompatible with the scenario
in (11/40a-b) would not only be compatible but would also capture Mary’s intended meaning.
Therefore, unlike the restrictor view and the straightforward operator view, the shifty operator
view captures the ambiguity between the two possible readings of (40a), i.e., Mary’s narrow-scope
intended reading and Susan’s wide-scope misunderstood reading.
What we hoped to address in this section is the issue of overgeneration resulting from the
various scope configurations between the modals might and if in might conditionals under the
operator view. One configuration in particular, the wide-scope reading of might over epistemic if,
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seems unavailable in the scenarios we explored. We leave it to further research to determine what
constraints might govern these cases. On the other hand, the operator view seems to undergenerate
available readings which turn out to be derivable given a shifty conditional operator. Again, we
leave it to further research to determine the exact nature of such shiftiness and whether the modal
operator if is necessarily shifty or whether its shiftiness can be cancelled in any way.
6 Luling
Let’s revisit our friends Mary and Susan who, after realizing that their fuel gauge is broken, have
just passed a sign indicating that they are leaving Luling. Given an updated map (figure 4),


















figure 4: Distance map of Lockhart and environs
(41) Mary: If we pass Gonzales, then we might run out of gas in Cuero.
a. Susan: If that’s the case, then, if we pass Belmont we’ll run out of gas in Nixon.
b. # Susan: If that’s the case, then, if we pass Belmont we’ll run out of gas in Gillett.
A circumstantial interpretation of the conditional operator in (41) is compatible with a future-
oriented reading of its antecedent. Given that Mary and Susan consider it possible, as far as they
currently know, that they have enough fuel for another 125 miles, a wide-scope reading of might
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over the conditional proposition is compatible with the scenario and, as predicted, the continuation
(41a) is felicitous. Suppose now that Mary and Susan have run out of gas but they’re not sure
where. Consider the following ifttc sequence.
(42) Mary: If we passed Gonzales, then we might have run out of gas in Cuero.
a. Susan: If that’s the case, then, if we passed Belmont we ran out of gas in Nixon.
b. # Susan: If that’s the case, then, if we passed Belmont we ran out of gas in Gillett.
As in the previous scenario, given that Mary and Susan consider it possible, as far as they
currently know, that when they left Luling they had enough fuel for another 125 miles, a wide-
scope reading of might over the conditional proposition is compatible with the updated scenario.
As predicted, the continuation (42a) is felicitous. However, the continuation in (42b) is infelicitous
suggesting that a wide-scope reading based on the possibility of them having enough fuel for
another 75 files after passing the first town outside of Luling, although also compatible with the
situation, is not possible. Finally consider the following ifttc sequence uttered between Mary and
Susan after reaching the first town outside of Luling but before running out of gas.
(43) Mary: If we (just) passed Gonzales, then we might run out of gas in Cuero.
a. ? Susan: If that’s the case, then, if we (just) passed Belmont we’ll run out of gas in
Nixon.
b. ? Susan: If that’s the case, then, if we (just) passed Belmont we’ll run out of gas in
Gillett.
Our judgements regarding the continuations in (43) are that both are infelicitous or at least
equally degraded, suggesting that unlike the previous two scenarios, a wide-scope reading of might
over the conditional proposition is either unavailable, or, if available, then the 75-mile inference is
as equally accessible as the 125-mile inference.
While more work needs to be done investigating the variability of judgements regarding these
ifttc sequences, what we hoped to highlight with the three scenarios in this section are possible
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interactions between tense and modal interpretations. Given that wide-scope readings of these
might conditionals require a circumstantial modal base for if, the degraded continuations in (43)
suggest that the necessary inferences are unavailable or at least difficult to attain. The 125-mile
inference which is compatible with all three scenarios is available in (41) and (42) and unavailable
or degraded in (43). The 75-mile inference which is compatible with the sequences with past
antecedents, (42) and (43), seems to be unavailable, or if available in (43), comparatively degraded
to the 125-mile inference. Determining whether tense truly plays a role in these judgements requires
further research.
7 Conclusion
(11) Mary: If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
a. # Susan: Well, if that’s the case, then, if we are on Route 80 we’re in Nixon.
b. Susan: Well, if that’s the case, then, if we are on Route 80 we’re in Martindale.
We provided evidence that certain contexts such as (11) involving might conditionals require
might to take wide-scope over a bare conditional proposition, as in the structure in (2b), in order to
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Mechanisms under the restrictor view to provide the necessary referent while bypassing such
a structure require (i) the availability of a covertly and/or anaphorically restricted covert necessity
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modal and (ii) restriction at a distance by a preceding if -clause. We then provided examples refuting
both (i) and (ii). Expanding the restrictor view with a covert circumstantial necessity modal in order
to provide the structure required to derive the asymmetry in (11) as well as capture the intuitive
reading of (1) lacks independent motivation since the consequents of bare conditionals pattern with
non-modal and epistemic modal interpretations but not with circumstantial modal interpretations.
(1) If we are on Route 183, we might be in Lockhart now.
On the other hand, the antecedents of conditionals pattern with both epistemic and circumstantial
interpretations. We argued that an operator view of if analyzed as a binary modal operator
compatible with both epistemic and circumstantial modal bases not only is compatible with the
observed temporal orientation of conditionals but also affords the structure required to derive the
intuitive meaning of (1) as well as the asymmetry in (11). However, such an analysis raises concerns
about overgeneration. We provided a scenario where the operator view derives a compatible reading
which appears to be unavailable. We also provided a scenario where the operator view is unable
to derive an available reading. We leave it to further research to investigate what constraints
might mitigate against overgeneration as well as how incorporating shiftiness might account for
missing readings with the goal of utilizing this operator view to account for readings of modalized
conditionals unaccounted for under other operator view analyses.
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